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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STERLING SERVICES, 
Plaintiff, Respondent 
SCT #16918 
vs. 
ROBERT B. MAUGHAN and 
CANDY MAUGHAN, Civil No. 17590 
Defendant, Appellant 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
The District Court dismissed Defendant's Counterclaim 
which alleged that Plaintiff violated Utah's Uniform Consumer 
Credit Code. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks a confirmation of the District Court's 
Order of Dismissal of Defendant's Counterclaim. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The Plaintiff owns and operates a service station and 
grocery store in Garden City, Utah. The Defendants became 
indebted to the Plaintiff through purchases made on an open 
account between 1973 and 1977 because they failed to pay for 
all the goods and services received. The parties had orally 
agreed that no interest would be charged if the account was 
kept current, however, since the account had been left 
1 
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delinquent for so long, the Plaintiff believed he was entitled 
to the amount of interest printed on some of the sales 
receipts, 12%. The trial court awarded the Plaintiff principal 
in the amount of $2,833.19 with 6% per annum interest for 13 
months of $184.16, or $3,017.35. Prior to s~it, Defendant had 
paid $3,000, which was applied to the account. The Court 
dismissed Plaintiff's claim for unpaid rents for use of 
premises owned by Plaintiff because the limitations period 
had; expired. 
The parties also entered into a conditioqal sales 
security agreement for a snowmobile executed December 30, 
1974 in which the Plaintiff was the Seller and the Defendant 
was the Buyer. The parties contemplated selling the contract 
to a bank, but the bank would not accept assignment of the 
con~ract and the parties thereafter agreed to certain conflicting 
terms regarding the agreement. The trial court awarded the 
Plaintiff $1,300.00 principal still owed on the snowmobile. 
The Plaintiff asked for the highest interest rate allowable, 
18% to be levied on the contract. Since confusion had 
resulted over the snowmobile contract, the Court found that 
the contract had been abandoned and had no force or effect. 
Accordingly, the Court awarded as a judgment in favor of the 
Plaintiff 6% interest per annum from Janury 25, 1975 to 
January 25, 1980 or $390.00. This brought the total amount 
awarded to the Plaintiff for the snowmobile contract to 
$1,690.00 including principal and simple interest. 
'Tlte Court dismis~:!!J i-Lr: rk~fendant: r .~~ counterclaim, which 
was b c1., ·-~ d on P 1 a inti ff ' s a 11 \.:!•Jed viol a ti on of Utah ' s Uniform 
Consumer Credit Code. This involves a renalty for creditors 
who contract for and receive a charge in excess of the 
allowable amount. The Court found as matters of fact that 
there was no contract and no money was received as a charge 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
in excess of the amount allowed by the u.c.c.c. The court 
explained that just because· the Plaintiff stated that a 
contract existed did not mean that the Plaintiff had contracted 
for or received payment in excess of the act. Defendant had 
denied its liability under a contract. Because there was no 
violation of the u.c.c.c., ~he Trial Court dismissed Defendant's 
counterclaim. 
POINT I 
; J 
The Trial Court properly dismissed Defendant's Counterclaim 
concerning Plaintiff's alleged violation of Utah's Uniform 
Consumer Credit Code because no contract existed between the 
parties and no monies were received as a charge in excess of 
the allowable amount. 
If a creditor has contracted for or received a charge 
in excess of the amount allowed by the u.c.c.c., the debtor 
may recover a penalty from the creditor (U.C.A. 708-3-201(4), 
708-5-202). The Trial Court found, as a matter of fact, 
that no contract existed between the parties. The Court 
also found, as a matter of fact, that the Plaintiff had not 
received money as a charge in excess of the amount allowed 
by the act. Since the u.c.c.c. only governs situations 
where a contract existed or monies were received as a charge 
in excess of the allowable amount, it has no application 
her~. 
POINT II 
The Trial Court properly dismissed the Defendant's 
Counterclaim as it related to the Plaintiff's alleged violation 
of the u.c.c.c. for failure to ~isclose the interest rate 
charged. 
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The Trial Court made no finding that Plaintiff failed 
to disclose. The Court did not find that the Plaintiff 
should have dis~losed any information beyond that which was 
disclosed. The Court's finding of a failure to disclose is. 
necessary for recovery under this act. 
Utah Code Annotated 70(B)-5-203 provides for civil 
li~bility for violation of the u.c.c.c. disclosure provisions. 
Th!s liability or penalty may be equal to the sum of the 
) 
~<::tual damaCJ·e sustained by the person, Here the Defendant 
sustained no actual damages. The Court awarded the Plaintiff 
the principal sum of money still due him plus interest of 6% 
per annum. Since Defendant was not hurt in this situation, 
this provision of the u. C. A. is not applicable. u. C. A. 
70(B)-5-203(b)(i) allows for liability of twice the amount 
I 
of any finance charge used in connection with this situation. 
The amended Complaint shows that the Defendant's $3,000.00 
payment in advance of suit was applied to the principal of 
the open account. The Court found, as a matter of fact, 
that no finance charge was collected by the Plaintiff. 
Since no finance charge was paid, this provision of the 
u.c.c.c. is inapplicable to this situation. Even if the 
Court found a finance charge existed, the liability in this 
section of the u.c.c.c. is not greater than $1,000.00. The 
Defendant's brief wrongly implies that this sum of money may 
be greater in this situation. 
Defendant's counsel makes an ~nfair argument in asserting 
that tl1e $3,000 .. 00 paid was applied to n:1 undisclosed interest 
charge. In his interrogatories, Defendant asked where the 
money was applied and the answer was that it was applied on 
the open account. The matter was thereafter brought to the 
Court and testimony was to the effect that $3,000.00 was 
payabl 1•· iov'ards the account according to whatever scheme the 
4 
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Court found just. Although the Plaintiff asked that it be 
applied toward the 12% inte~est on the open account, the 
Court found against the Plaintiff on that issue. This does 
not mean that the interest was applied on an undisclosed 
interest charge, or that it was improperly implied. 
The case of Bill Brown Motor, Inc. v. Crane 589 P2d 
708 (Okla. 1978) involves a seller's failure to disclose 
credit information to a co-signer. The case stands on the 
principal that if a seller regularly engages in similar 
credit transactions, failure to disclose credit information 
will result in a fine or penalty. Plaintiff did not regularly 
sell snowmobiles. It was not part of his'normal business. 
Defendant attempts to apply· Brown to a situation that is not 
similar. Plaintiff merely asked the Court if he might 
charge 18% on the snowmobile contract. Plaintiff asked for 
12% interest on the open account because some of the sales 
receipts had 12% printed on them. Plaintiff in good faith, 
felt he was entitled to interest on Defendant's delinquent 
account. The Court awarded Plaintiff 6% interest on the 
entire amount. 
The case of Knox v. Thomas 512 P2d 664 (Utah 1973), a 
disclosure case, is not applicable because it alleged the 
Defendant failed to calculate the percentage rate and enter 
it. The reason this case is distinguishable is because 
there the issue was whether there was a calculation and 
whether it was entered. The Defendant in his Counterclaim 
failed to allege or prove any specific items that should 
have been calculated and entered that were not. 
The Oklahoma case on which the Defendant relies and 
upon which he attempts to write Utah law, Kuykendall v. Malernee, 
516 P2d 558 (Okla. 1973) can be distinguished. The case 
dealt with a situation which started out as a loan of money 
5 
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and not a consumer or other purchase. The amount of the 
loan was $600.00 and was repayable in 6 months of $720.00. 
In fact, the parties post dated a check for $720.00 with 
which to make the repayment. The interest charge of $120.00 
for 6 months was calculated to be about;40% interest. It is 
not surprising that the Court found the interest rate was 
cl~arly in excess of 18%. The Court also found the lender 
was a pawn broker and went on to ac.tually,;.~ind that there 
was a supervised loan. In Kuykendall, the Court m~de findings 
of .a supervised loan, made a specific finding of a rate of 
interest, made a finding that there was a consumer loan, and 
made a finding that the lender was definitely subject to 
pawn broker requirements of the state of Oklahoma. Moreover, 
the Oklahoma statute required that loans in.the excess of 
10% (as compared to Utah's 18%) constituted a supervised 
loan. The Court also found that the matter was brought 
within the statute of limitations. Clearly1 the case is not 
precedent for the case being considered by this Court. None 
of ·the findings of the Oklahoma Court case were found or 
urged upon the Court. In fact, the allegations were not 
adequately presented nor was proof offered which would 
prevent a finding along the same line as was made in Kuykendall. 
In our situation, the Trial Court found there was nJ 
failure to disclose on the Plaintiff's part. The Plaintiff 
in good faith felt that he could charge interest because 
the Defendant had failed to keep the revolving account 
current and because some of the sales slips had 12% printed 
on them and bore Defendant's siqnature or initials. The 
Plaintiff in good faith felt it was proper to charge interest 
becausf:> of Defendant's failure to keep the account current. 
'I'he Defendant's Counterclaim doesn't. meet the criteria 
specified in Utah rode Annotated 70(b)-5-203 which provides 
for civil liRbility foe violation of the u.c.c.c. disclosure 
provision: 
6 
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A. Ne;> actual damage wa~i incurred by the Defendant 
by any of Plaintiff's actions. 
B. The Court found that no finance charge w~s 
levied by the Plaintiff. 
C. Defendant attempts to construe this statute 
so that it implies that liability on Plaintiff's part, if 
there were any violation, would be greater than $1,000. 
D. Defendant did not make his claim within 
the one or two year period required by the u.c.c.c. 
existed. 
E. The Court specifically found no contract 
,J \ 
Because the fact situation in this case is not applicable 
to any of the present statutes and because the Court found 
no failure to disclose on Plaintiff's part occured in this 
situation, the Trial Court properly dismissed Defendant's 
Counterclaim. 
POINT III 
The Trial Court correctly dismissed Defendant's Counterclaim 
as it related to Plaintiff's alleged attempt to receive 
excessive interest rates in violation of the u.c.c.c. provisions. 
The Trial Court made no finding concerning excessive 
interest rates being charged by Plaintiff. 
The present usury statute for consumer loans in Utah is 
codifiPd in 70B-3-201, U.C.A. This statute provides the 
maximum legal rate of interest in consumer loans to be 18% 
per year if the loan finance charge contracted for and received 
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does not exceed 1 and 1/2 percent per month. The Defendant 
failed to allege that the snowmobile contract was for consumer 
goods, and 708-5-202 provides that in nonconsumer related 
transactions, the'; parties may contract for any interest rate. 
The, Court did not make a specific finding as to whether the' 
snowmobile purchase was a consumer purchase or not. Thus, 
there is not justification for arguin~ penalties,~ayable 
und~r 70B-5-202,f as the Defendant did relative to the second 
' paragraph of his Counterclaim. In fact, although the Defendant 
fails to specify wherein the Plaintiff allegedly violated 
1os~s-202;·:~}'the only possible subpart· violated would be 
subpart (21~ and· that section, as well as all other sections, 
provides a one year statute of limitations {or under c~rtain 
circumstances a 2 year statute of limitations) after which 
no action can be brought.. According to the snowmobile· 
con,tract admitted and upon which Defendants rely for their 
couriterclaim, the last payment ~ould·have been made 25· 
months afte~ Ja~~ary 25, 1975. The Counter~laim is dated 
March 5, 1979, well beyond the period of limitations.-
The Defendant rests his entire argument for the Counterclaim 
on .the appearance of the 18 .16% interest shown on the face 
of the alleged contract. That contract is the same the 
Court found the parties had both abandoned. Nowhere except 
in the argument does he allege that the Plaintiff actually 
attempted to enforce the rate of interest. Clearly the 
Plaintiff attempted to receive 18% interest on the complaint 
and in the amended complaint but never more than that amount. 
As the evidence showea, the actual caL.'.,,Ln:i.on was based on 
16.97%. The Plaintiff did not ask for any other interest 
rate than the highest leg,d rate and at ·:d l times acknowledged 
and as'::c·rted a rate at 18% per annum or less. No evidence 
showed that the actual rate charged would be 18.16% was 
eithe~ offered or presented or found by the Court. Even if 
the Court would have found that the Plaintiff receivLd 
excessive interest rates, the u.c.c.c. would not have applied. 
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The U.C.C.C. provision 70(8)-2-104 provides for maximum 
interest charges for consumer related transactions. A 
consumer credit sale is defined as: 
a. The granting .of credit by "a seller who 
regularly engages as a seller in credit transactions of the 
same kind," 
b. A buyer who is a person other than an organization, 
c. The goods and services are purchased primarily 
for personal, family, household or agricultural purchases, 
and, 
d. The debt is payable in installments. 
The Defendant's counterclaim alleged that the Plaintiff 
attempted to charge interest in excess of that allowed by 
law. The entire case hinges upon the fact that 18.16% was 
written on the face of the snowmobile contract. The Defendant 
simply assumes that the u.c.c.c. provision incorporates the 
Plaintiff. The statute emphasises that the seller must 
regularly engage as a seller in credit transactions of the 
same kind. Plaintiff was regularly engaged in a gas and 
grocery business in Rich County and did allow some revolving 
credit accounts, such as Defendants, but he did not attempt 
to collect an interest rate higher than 12% on such accounts. 
"Distinctions must be drawn between persons engaging in 
the business of making loans and those who make infrequent 
loans, for occasional acts of loaning money to accommodate 
ones customers and friends does not constitute engaging 
in the business of loaning money." Hammond v. Reeves 
552 P2d 1237, 89N.M. 389. 
In Hammond the lender was shown to have made 5 small 
loans. The majority of his business came from a different 
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source of income. ,The Court of App~als affirmed the trial 
court decision that the lender was ~ot engaged in- the business 
of lending. .'~;:~•:~:~~Yi; 
As Hammond explains, whether one engages in the business 
of lending money or credit transactions is to be determined 
fro~ all the circumstances. A careful examination of the 
facts shows that the selling of the snowmobile on the Plaintiff's 
part was a unique situation and that the Plaintiff did not 
regularly engage in credit transactions of the same kind. 
Since ?O(B)-2-104 applies to those who regularly en~age as 
"s~llers in credit transact~on, of the same kind," it is not 
applicable to our present situation. since Defendant's 
entire counterclaim rests upon the fact t~at the contract 
for the snowmobile had 18 .16% interest per ar~nurn printed on 
its face it fails because the u.c.c.c. is not applicable in 
th.i~ situation. 
In summary, the trial court made no finding of excessive 
interest rates in this case. The calculations of the amount 
charged resulted in an actual rate less than the allowable 
rate provided by the u.c.c.c. No charge was ever received 
in this case. No compensable harm was incurred by the 
Defendant, who kept the item without even paying principal 
until this suit was filed. The u.c.c.c. does not apply to 
the snowmobile contract. Since the Defendant rested his 
ent.ire counterclaim on the snowmobile contract, the Trial 
Court correctly dismissed it. 
POIN'I' 4 
The Trial Cou.t properly refused tn award Defendant's 
attorney's fees because Defendant failed to show a violation 
of the r1.c.c.c. There is no reason to pay Defendants attorney 
fees in this matter. 
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CONCLUSION 
The Plaintiff may not have been successful in all he 
asked for, but he clearly showed that there was more due 
than had been paid on the open account. He also showed that 
there was a principal balance due on the snowmobile contract. 
He disclosed that the interest being charged on the open 
account was 12% and the full legal rate of 18~ on the snowmobile 
contract. He may not have been successful in all his claims, 
but he was certainly successful in showing that he was 
entitled to be paid. The Court ruled on all of the issues 
and made findings which would foreclose any relief for the 
Defendant under its Counterclaim. The Court properly dismissed 
the Defendant's Counterclaim because no violation of the 
u.c.c.c. occured. 
RESPECTIVELY submitted this ~~day of July, 1980. 
Raymond N. Malouf, For 
' MALO , MALOUF & JENKINS'' 
Attorneys for Plaintiff, R 
21 West Center 
Logan, UT 84321 
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